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INTERCEPTION! THE COURTS GET ANOTHER PASS AT THE
NCAA AND THE INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
OF PROPOSITION 16 IN PRYOR V NCAA
I. INTRODUCTION
The implementation of the National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation's (NCAA) initial eligibility requirements for athletic participa-
tion sparked controversy when they were first enacted as
Proposition 48 sixteen years ago.' The controversy continues today
with the adoption of revised guidelines entitled Proposition 16.2
Proposition 16 has generated a great deal of outspoken opposition
from coaches and organizations such as the Black Coaches
Association. 3
Most of the challenges to the NCAA's initial eligibility require-
ments center around their impact on minority student-athletes. 4
1. See Mark Asher, NCAA Could Alter Eligibility Standards; Test Score Emphasis
Might Be Played Down, WASi-. POST, Aug. 8, 2002, at D1 (noting new NCAA eligibil-
ity requirements led to protests when Proposition 48 was passed). The most vocal
protests came from "coaches, college administrators and others who argued that
the [SATs] were racially and socioeconomically biased, as well as an inaccurate
indicator of academic potential." Id.; see also Welch Suggs, Who's Going to Play?
Coaches and Advisors Fear Racial Impact of the NCAA's Proposed Academic Standards,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,July 26, 2002, at 43 (discussing coaches' beliefs that NCAA
emphasis on academics is really about race). Jim Harrick, former men's basketball
coach at the University of Georgia, claimed that the NCAA was "legislating against
African-American individuals." See id. John Chaney, Temple University's men's
basketball coach, called the standards "ethnic cleansing." See id.
2. See Suggs, supra note 1, at 43 (asserting outspoken opponents of Proposi-
tion 48 have returned to fight against Proposition 16); see also Robert K. Fullin-
wider, Academic Standards and the NCAA, at http://www.puaf.umd.edu/IPPP/
spring-summer99/academicstandards.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2003) (explain-
ing black coaches were so angered by Proposition 16 that they considered boycott-
ing NCAA events).
3. See Fullinwider, supra note 2 (noting arguments against Proposition 16,
pointing out some students need individual assessment and Proposition 16 ex-
cludes students who could succeed in college). "[I]n the words of the Black
Coaches Association, 'minority and low-income student atheletes, academically
qualified as measured by their classroom performance,' have borne the brunt of a
misguided effort to set academic standards." Id. (quoting statements by Black
Coaches Association).
4. See id. (stating Proposition 16 is unfair due to its disproportionate effect on
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Opponents to the guidelines allege that the guidelines discriminate
along racial and socioeconomic lines.5
The gravamen of their complaint: the use of the SAT cut-
off score, which blacks fail to reach in markedly higher
proportions than whites. John Thompson, then-coach of
Georgetown University's basketball team, complained that
poor minority kids were at a disadvantage taking the
"mainstream-oriented" SAT. "Certain kids," he noted just
after the federal court's decision, "require individual as-
sessment. Some urban schools cater to poor kids, low-in-
come kids, black and white. To put everybody on the
same playing field [i.e., to treat them the same in testing]
is just crazy." 6
When the more rigorous Proposition 16 replaced the initial guide-
lines of Proposition 48, black coaches were so angered that they
threatened to boycott NCAA events. 7
In Pryor v. NCAA, 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit faced the latest challenge to the legality of Proposi-
tion 16.9 The NCAA insists one of Proposition 16's goals is to im-
prove graduation rates among African-American student-athletes.10
The two African-American plaintiffs in this case alleged the policy's
true goal was to "screen out" black student-athletes from receiving
athletic scholarships." Plaintiffs brought their claims against the
NCAA under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI")
5. See Suggs, supra note 1, at 43 (explaining coaches' beliefs that by instituting
Proposition 16, NCAA is telling coaches to recruit white players instead of black
ones from poor backgrounds).
6. Fullinwider, supra note 2. The federal court decision Cureton v. NCAA
sparked these comments byJohn Thompson. See id.; see also Cureton v. NCAA, 198
F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999) (hereinafter Cureton 1]. For a discussion of Cureton I, see
infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
7. See Fullinwider, supra note 2.
8. 288 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002).
9. See id.; see also Kay Hawes, From Restricted Earnings to Initial Eligibility, Many
Off-the-Court Issues Ended Up in Court, at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/
19991220/active/3626n24.html (Dec. 20, 1999) (noting there have been several
cases stemming from Proposition 16).
10. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 556 (discussing contents of memorandum from
NCAA and stating that Proposition 16 has led to increase in graduation rates for
minorities and no other model would achieve this goal); see also Nathan Hunt,
Note, Cureton v. NCAA: Fumble! The Flawed Use of Proposition 16 by the NCAA, 31 U.
TOL. L. REV. 273, 282 (2000) (explaining Proposition 16 was intended to further
academic success goals of Proposition 48).
11. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 556 (detailing plaintiffs' allegations that NCAA pro-
ceeded with Proposition 16 despite knowing there would be adverse affects on
black student-athletes).
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and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981").12 The Third Circuit ruled that the
plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. 13
In 1999, the Third Circuit held that the discrimination theory
of disparate impact could not prevail against the NCAA.' 4 This
holding greatly hindered discrimination suits against the NCAA be-
cause it limited the available theories on which discrimination cases
may be based.15 In Pyor, the Third Circuit reopened possibilities
for plaintiffs to sue the NCAA for discrimination. 16 Although the
court did not settle the dispute, the opinion does suggest that pur-
poseful discrimination suits may succeed against the NCAA in the
future. 17
This Note focuses on the Pryor decision and analyzes its hold-
ing. Section II provides a detailed discussion of the factual under-
pinnings of the Pryor case.' 8 Section III introduces the NCAA and
examines its initial eligibility requirements. 19 Section III also dis-
cusses Title VI and § 1981, concluding with a brief description of
relevant case law.2 0 Section IV explains the Third Circuit's reason-
ing and analyzes this reasoning in light of relevant statutes and case
law.21 Section V discusses the potential effect this case will have on
future challenges to NCAA requirements. 22
12. See id. (citing basis of claims); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (2000). For a further discussion of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
13. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 570 (stating court remanded case on two
allegations).
14. See Cureton I, 198 F.3d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that regulations
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination applied only to specific programs re-
ceiving federal financial assistance).
15. See id.
16. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 561 (reversing dismissal of claim for purposeful
discrimination).
17. See id. at 570 (remanding case to district court).
18. For a discussion of the facts surrounding the Third Circuit's holding in
Pryor, see infra notes 23-49 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the NCAA and its eligibility requirements, see infra
notes 50-94 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the background information regarding the NCAA and
the statutory and judicial framework concerning intentional discrimination, see
infra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the Pryor court's analysis, see infra notes 121-82 and
accompanying text.
22. For a discussion on the potential impact of the Pryor decision, see infra
notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
3
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II. FACTS: KELLY PRYOR AND WARREN SPIVEY STEP UP TO THE
LINE OF SCRIMMAGE
Plyor v. NCAA is the most recent challenge to the NCAA's ini-
tial eligibility qualifications enumerated in Proposition 16, which
took effect in 1996.23 Kelly Pryor and Warren Spivey, both African-
Americans, were recruited to play varsity athletics at national uni-
versities in 1999.24 While still a senior in high school, Pryor signed
a national letter of intent ("NLI") to play varsity soccer at San Jose
State University beginning the following school year.25 Spivey
signed an NLI to play football at the University of Connecticut. 26
Both plaintiffs would be recipients of athletic scholarships from
their respective schools.27
Pursuant to NCAA regulations, all students who are to receive
athletic scholarships must meet certain conditions.2 These condi-
tions are encompassed by the eligibility requirements instituted by
Proposition 16, which governs athletic participation in colleges and
universities. 29 If the requirements are not met, the NLI agreement
is void and the student-athlete cannot participate in varsity athletics
and cannot receive athletic scholarships.' 0 Pryor and Spivey were
23. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 553-54 (discussing other cases challenging NCAA's
eligibility requirements, such as NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), Cureton
v. NCAA, 252 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Cureton II], and Cureton 1, 198
F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999)).
24. See id. at 554 (stating race of plaintiffs, which is primary source of plain-
tiffs' claims).
25. See id. at 554-55 (explaining Pryor signed NLI, which directly relates to
§ 1981 claim). NLIs are contracts between student-athletes, the NCAA, and the
educational institution the student-athletes plan to attend. See id. at 555. Section
1981 involves the freedom to make and enforce contracts. See NCAA, Frequently-
Asked Questions on the National Letter of Intent/Financial Aid, at http://wwwl.ncaa.
org/membership/membership-svcs/eligibility-recruiting/faqs/nli_financialaid.
html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003):
The [NLI] is a binding agreement between a prospective student-athlete
and an institution in which the institution agrees to provide a prospective
student-athlete who is admitted to the institution and is eligible for finan-
cial aid tinder NCAA rules athletics aid for one academic year in ex-
change for the prospect's agreement to attend the institution for one
academic year.
Id.
26. See Pyor, 288 F.3d at 555 (detailing Warren Spivey's agreement to play
football for university).
27. See id. (stating both plaintiffs were to receive athletic scholarships subject
to ftlfillment of eligibility requirements).
28. See id. ("[T]he NLIs signed by Pryor and Spivey contain a condition that
would render the agreement void if they failed to meet the eligibility requirements
established in Proposition 16.").
29. See id. For a further discussion of Proposition 16, see infra notes 81-91 and
accompanying text.
30. See Ptyor, 288 F.3d at 555 (explaining conditional requirements of NLIs).
Vol. 10: p. 389
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both unable to fulfill the Proposition 16 requirements. 31 Pryor peti-
tioned the NCAA for "partial qualifier" status due to a learning disa-
bility. 32 The NCAA granted the petition, permitting Pryor to keep
her scholarship and to practice with her team.33 She could not,
however, compete in games or competitions. 34
In February 2000, Pryor and Spivey sued the NCAA in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania.35 Pryor brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.36 Spiveyjoined with Pryor to
bring suit for intentional discrimination under Title VI and
§ 1981.3 7 Pryor and Spivey admitted in their complaint that the
purported goal of Proposition 16 was to improve graduation rates
among black student-athletes. 38 Yet, they asserted that Proposition
16 actually rendered an increased number of African-American ath-
letes ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics and receive
scholarships.3 9 The plaintiffs further alleged the NCAA knew of
and intended these effects. 40 In its response, the NCAA stated that
the purpose of Proposition 16 was "laudable" and had no malignant
intent towards minority student-athletes. 41
31. See id. (stating both Pryor and Spivey failed to qualify for eligibility under
Proposition 16, thus voiding their NLIs).
32. See id. Pryor could also "earn back" her year of missed eligibility accord-
ing to an NCAA bylaw. See id.; see also NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.3.3.2 (describing
how students with learning disabilities can earn back fourth season of eligibility).
The University of Connecticut appealed to the NCAA on behalf of Spivey, yet the
petition and its appeal were both denied. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 555. For a further
discussion of partial qualification, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
33. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 555 (listing benefits of partial qualifier status over
non-qualifier status).
34. See id. (explaining limitations on partial qualifiers).
35. See id.
36. See id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12117 (2000) (ensuring equal protection for disabled Americans); Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794(e) (2000) (providing rehabilitation services to
improve health of mothers and children).
37. See Pyor, 288 F.3d at 555. For a discussion of Title VI and § 1981, see infra
notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
38. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 552 (establishing Proposition 16 as facially neutral
rule with goal of improving graduation rates).
39. See id. (stating plaintiff's complaint enunciated negative effects of Proposi-
tion 16).
40. See id. (explaining why cause of action for purposeful discrimination is
proper).
41. See id. at 552, 559 (explaining that NCAA's admission of trying to help
African-American athletes rebuts inference that it is discriminating against them).
The NCAA moved for dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative summaryjudgment at the plead-
ing stage and prior to any discovery. See id. at 556; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
5
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The district court dismissed Pryor's claims under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act citing a lack of "ripeness."42 The court pro-
ceeded to dismiss both plaintiffs' theories of purposeful discrimina-
tion. 4 3 The theory of "deliberate indifference" could not stand
because Title VI did not provide a remedy, and the § 1981 claim
was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed "to adequately allege in-
tentional discrimination and this deficiency merit[ed] dismissal of
the [§ 1981] claim. '44
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Third Circuit in
2002.45 The issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs had
"stated a claim for purposeful, racial discrimination under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. and 42
U.S.C. § 1981, by alleging that the NCAA adopted certain standards
because of their adverse impact on black student athletes seeking
college scholarships." 46 The Third Circuit reversed in part and af-
firmed in part. 47 The court held that the plaintiffs had a sufficient
claim for purposeful discrimination under Title VI and § 1981.48
The Third Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for lack of ripeness. 49
III. BACKGROUND
A. The NCAA
The NCAA is the principal governing body of intercollegiate
athletics in the United States.50 It began as the Intercollegiate Ath-
42. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 557. The court concluded that Pryor's claim was not
ripe because she could still receive relief from NCAA according to Bylaw 14.3.3.2.
See id.; see also NCAA Division I Bylaw 14.3.3.2 (clarifying learning disability loop-
hole). If Pryor completed seventy-five percent of her degree requirements, she
could receive a year of eligibility in her fifth year. See id.




46. See id. at 552 (discussing issues raised before Third Circuit).
47. See id. at 570 (stating court's final decree).
48. See Piyor, 288 F.3d at 570 (citing two of plaintiffs' claims to be heard by
trial court).
49. See id. (explaining Pryor's claims would not be heard because she may still
acquire relief through NCAA).
50. See What Is the NCAA?, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/what is the ncaa.
html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003) (noting NCAA is dedicated to administration of
intercollegiate athletics); see also National Collegiate Athletic Purposes Are, at http://
www.ncaa.org/about/purposes.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003) [hereinafter NCAA
Purposes]. One of the purposes of the NCAA is "[t]o uphold the principle of insti-
tutional control of, and responsibility for, all intercollegiate sports in conformity
with the constitution and bylaws of the Association." Id. Another purpose of the
[Vol. 10: p. 389
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letic Association of the United States ("IAAUS") in 1906, and took
the name National Collegiate Athletic Association in 1910. 5 1 The
NCAA is a "voluntary association of about 1,200 college and univer-
sities, athletic conferences and sports organizations. '52 Its member
institutions are divided into three separate groups: Division I, Divi-
sion II, and Division III.53 These divisions exist for purposes of by-
law legislation and equality among the members of intercollegiate
athletic competition. 54 Each division adopts its own bylaws, which
are only applicable within the particular division, while a number of
regulations apply to the membership as a whole. 55
NCAA is "[t]o legislate, through bylaws or by resolutions of a Convention, upon
any subject of general concern to the members related to the administration of
intercollegiate athletics." Id.; see also NCAA Governance at a Glance, at http://
wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/governance/orgchart.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2003) (illustrating NCAA governance hierarchy).
51. ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASso-
CIATION 38-39 (1992). The NCAA was founded to combat increasing levels of vio-
lence in college football. See id. at 38. The original purpose of the NCAA was to
"reduc[e] violence and standardiz[e] play." See id. at 40; see also History of the NCAA:
It Was the Flying Wedge, Football's Major Offense in 1905, That Spurred the Formation of
the NCAA, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/history.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003).
It was not until 1921, when the first national championship was held, that the
NCAA progressed further than "a discussion group and rules-making body." See id.
52. What Is the NCAA ?, supra note 50 (citing number of organizations involved
in NCAA); see also Composition of the NCAA, at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/
membershipsvcs/membership-breakdown.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003) (listing
number and types of members as of September 1, 2002).
53. See What's the Difference Between Divisions I, II and III?, at http://www.ncaa.
org/about/div_criteria.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2003). Each division has its own
criteria that must be met in order for a member institution to qualify as part of that
division. See id. Division I schools, for instance, must sponsor a minimum of seven
sports for each gender. See id. Division I members also must meet certain financial
aid award limits and criteria for scheduling contests and attendance. See id. Divi-
sion II institutions must sponsor a minimum of four sports for both genders. See
id. Division III schools must sponsor at least five sports for both genders. See id. In
contrast to the other divisions, Division III student-athletes do not receive athletic
scholarships. See id.
54. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 448 U.S. 179, 183 (1988) (explaining governance
of member institutions by NCAA). "Basic policies of the NCAA are determined by
the members at annual conventions. Between conventions, the Association is gov-
erned by its Council, which appoints various committees to implement specific
programs." Id. The NCAA has adopted rules, called legislation, governing its
member institutions. See id. These legislations apply to many issues, such as aca-
demic eligibility standards, financial aid, and recruitment. See id.
55. See Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 553 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing how each
division adopts its own bylaws including rules for freshmen eligibility); see also
Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 715-16 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (focusing on promul-
gation of bylaw affecting eligibility in members of Division I only).
7
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B. NCAA Eligibility Guidelines
One of the primary functions of the NCAA is the establishment
of requirements concerning athletic scholarships, recruiting, and
academic eligibility of incoming freshman athletes. 56 The NCAA
has sought to preserve the integrity of both academic institutions
and intercollegiate athletics by imposing eligibility guidelines that
are "designed to assure proper emphasis on educational objectives,
to promote competitive equity among institutions and to prevent
exploitation of student athletes. 57
In 1965, the NCAA enacted the "1.6 Rule," its first attempt at
creating uniform eligibility requirements for freshman athletes. 58
This rule sought to predict whether the entering student-athlete
would be able to earn a first-year grade point average (GPA) of 1.6
or better.59 This projection was made through the use of predic-
tion tables and formulas combining the student's high school GPA
and his or her score on either the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or
American College Test (ACT). 6 Failure to meet the benchmark
level necessary to predict a GPA of 1.6 rendered the student-athlete
ineligible to participate in collegiate athletics during his or her
freshman year.61
56. See NCAA Purposes, supra note 50 (elaborating on NCAA purposes and
goals). Above all, "the NCAA strives to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an inte-
gral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the
student body." Id.
57. TylerJ. Murray, Note, Illegalizing the NCAA 's Eligibility Rules: Did Cureton v.
NCAA Go Too Far, or Not Far Enough?, 26 J. LEGIS. 101, 102-03 (2000) (quoting
NCAA Constitution).
58. See Nathan Hunt, supra note 10, at 278-79 (describing institution of "1.6
Rule" after failure of "sanity code"). The "sanity code" sought to govern eligibility
by banning all athletic scholarships. See id. at 278; see also Michael J. Mondello &
Amy M. Abernathy, An Historical Overview of Student-Athlete Academic Eligibility and the
Future Implications ofCureton v. NCAA, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 127, 128 (2000)
(explaining academic standards for athletes declined during early 1970s after insti-
tution of "1.6 Rule"); Murray, supra note 57, at 103 (illustrating "1.6 Rule" as first
attempt to fulfill NCAA's mission).
59. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 278-79 (discussing "1.6 Rule's" objective in pre-
dicting freshman GPA); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 128 (ex-
plaining some athletic conferences required additional minimum scores); Murray,
supra note 57, at 103 (elaborating on "1.6 Rule" and its purpose).
60. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 278-79 (describing formula prediction tables);
see also Murray, supra note 57, at 103 (expanding on formulas used to determine
whether 1.6 GPA can be met).
61. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 279 (explaining violation of this rule con-
fronted colleges and universities with possibilities of sanctions); see also Murray,
supra note 57, at 103 (stating student-athletes were able to re-qualify following
freshman year).
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The "1.6 Rule" was repealed in 1973 and replaced with the "2.0
Rule." 62 This new rule removed the standardized test score from
consideration in determining eligibility.63 It also disposed of the
convoluted prediction formulas used in the "1.6 Rule."6 4 Instead,
the new rule required student-athletes to attain a high school GPA
of 2.0 or higher in order to be eligible to participate in collegiate
athletics. 65 This rule generated much reservation among NCAA of-
ficials over the lack of uniformity in high school grading proce-
dures.66 Many feared that the new rule would lead to an abuse of
the system, whereby high school faculties would pass unqualified
athletes. 67
Public outcry and scandal during the 1980s provoked the
NCAA to change its eligibility requirements for college athletes
once again. 68 In 1986, the NCAA implemented Proposition 48.69
Proposition 48 sought to accomplish two goals:
First, an emphasis was placed on increasing the gradua-
tion rate of those student-athletes specifically competing
in the revenue-generating sports of football and men's
62. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 279 (noting that after only eight years, "1.6
Rule" was repealed and replaced with more stringent "2.0 Rule"); see also Murray,
supra note 57, at 103 (explaining that regardless of eligibility, any student-athlete
could receive athletic scholarships).
63. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 279 (explaining GPA was sole requirement for
eligibility); see also Murray, supra note 57, at 103 (stating controversial standardized
test scores were removed from consideration for eligibility).
64. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 279 (noting praise for removal of confusing
formulas).
65. See id. (explaining sole requirement of earning GPA of 2.0 upon gradua-
tion from high school); see also Murray, supra note 57, at 103 (explaining that GPA
of 2.0 was sole requirement as of 1973 amendments).
66. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 279 (discussing fear of NCAA officials over lack
of uniformity in grading procedures throughout country).
67. See id. (stating despite concerns and mounting scandal, NCAA continued
to use "2.0 Rule").
68. See id. (discussing scandals involving exploitation of athletes and increas-
ing public perception that athletes were not academically qualified); see also
Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 129 (explaining "dumb jock" image, re-
cruitment scandals, and academic exploitation caused NCAA to institute new stan-
dards). "A consensus among researchers developed that student-athletes,
especially minority student-athletes, were being exploited for their athletic talent
while their academic endeavors were being pushed aside." Id.; see also Murray,
supra note 57, at 103 (noting scandals and poor graduation rates forced NCAA to
re-evaluate its standards).
69. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 279 (maintaining Proposition 48 was imple-
mented to establish uniform eligibility policy designed to increase academic profi-
ciency). Unlike its predecessors, "Proposition 48 set forth legitimate academic
eligibility requirements for NCAA student athletes." Id.; see also Murray, supra note
57, at 104 (stating Proposition 48 was instituted to stiffen eligibility requirements).
9
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basketball. Second, efforts were made to ensure that stu-
dent-athletes were not being counseled into courses pri-
marily designed to safeguard their eligibility with little or
no concern for their progress toward graduation. 7°
Proposition 48 compelled high school athletes to attain a GPA of at
least 2.0 in eleven core academic courses and score at least a 700 on
the SAT or 15 on the ACT. 71
Proposition 48 also introduced the notion of qualifiers and
partial qualifiers. 72 Qualifiers were those student-athletes who met
the Proposition 48 standards and thus could compete in collegiate
athletics and receive athletic scholarships. 73 Partial qualifiers were
student-athletes who fulfilled only one of the two academic require-
ments of Proposition 48.74 These student-athletes could receive
athletic scholarships, but could not participate in collegiate athlet-
ics during freshman year.75 The ban was lifted after the partial
qualifier's first year, provided the athlete was in good academic
standing at that time with his or her college or university. 76
The controversy surrounding the NCAA's enactment of Pro-
position 48 continued after its adoption.77 Proposition 48 support-
70. Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 130-31.
71. See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 61 (elaborating on Proposition 48);
see also Hunt, supra note 10, at 280 (emphasizing requirements of Proposition 48);
Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 131 (illustrating requirements of Proposi-
tion 48); Murray, supra note 57, at 104 (listing required courses needed to com-
plete as condition for eligibility). To be considered for eligibility, a student must
complete courses in English, mathematics, natural sciences, and social sciences.
See id.
72. See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 61 (expanding on difference between
qualifiers and partial qualifiers); see also Hunt, supra note 10, at 280 (noting differ-
ence between qualifiers and partial qualifiers).
73. See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 61 (clarifying that freshman qualifiers
were eligible for financial aid and could practice and compete for four years); see
also Hunt, supra note 10, at 280 (distinguishing requirements for full versus partial
qualifier status).
74. See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 61 (explaining that partial qualifiers
were those who met 2.0 GPA requirement but did not achieve other require-
ments); see also Hunt, supra note 10, at 280 (stating partial qualifiers fulfilled only
one of Proposition 48's two requirements).
75. See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 61 (describing how partial qualifiers
could receive "institutional" financial aid, but could not practice or play for school
during freshman year). A partial qualifier loses one year of eligibility. See id.; see
also Hunt, supra note 10, at 280 (describing status of partial qualifiers).
76. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 280 (explaining partial qualifier status and
ability of partial qualifier to gain full status after first year).
77. See id. Opponents of the standards argued that they were too high and
caused a disparate impact on minority athletes. See id. "Of those athletes declared
ineligible, 84% of the football players and 92% of the basketball players were Afri-
can-American." Id.; see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 51, at 61-2 (citing criticism
Vol. 10: p. 389
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ers hailed it as a success by citing rising graduation rates and the
increased credibility of student-athletes. 78 Critics of the require-
ments were concerned "that Proposition 48 ha[d] a disparate im-
pact on minority athletes. '79 Opponents of the new requirements
relied on a 1990 study conducted by the Knight Commission, which
concluded that eighty-six percent of the athletes harmed by Pro-
position 48 were African-American. 80
In an effort to strengthen Proposition 48, the NCAA intro-
duced Proposition 16.81 Proposition 16 took effect in 1996 and
provides the eligibility requirements that are in operation today.
82
Proposition 16 altered previous eligibility requirements by increas-
ing the number of required core high school classes from eleven to
thirteen and by raising the minimum high school GPA from 2.0 to
2.5.83 Proposition 16 also implemented a "sliding scale" or index
enabling the prospective freshmen to balance a lower GPA with a
higher SAT or ACT score. 84 Thus, a student with a minimum GPA
of 2.0 must earn an SAT score of 1010, while a student with a 2.5
GPA or higher qualifies with the minimum qualifying SAT score of
focused on racial bias); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 134-35
(discussing argument that SAT scores are poor indicators of success).
78. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 281 (discussing support of Proposition 48); see
also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 132 (proclaiming proponents' claim
that Proposition 48 was successful).
79. Hunt, supra note 10, at 280 (pointing to large percentage of African-
Americans as being ineligible athletes after rule's implementation).
80. See id. The Knight Commission, a Miami-based philanthropic organiza-
tion, conducted a study in 1990 on the effects of Proposition 48. See id.
81. See Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 135 (stating two ways Proposi-
tion 16 strengthened Proposition 48).
82. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 281 (stating Proposition 16 is still in effect
today); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 135 (explaining how Pro-
position 48 was revised into Proposition 16 at 1992 convention, but was not insti-
tuted until 1996).
83. See PHILIP D. GRAYSON, NCAA COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE 2
(Michael V. Earle ed., 2002) (setting forth present eligibility requirements for en-
tering student-athletes). The core courses include four years of English, two years
of mathematics, two years of science, one additional year of one of the previous
three subjects, two years of social science and two years of any additional course.
See id.
84. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 281 (describing sliding scale instituted by Pro-
position 16); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 136-37 (introducing
"initial eligibility index," which allowed students to remain eligible by balancing
lower GPA with higher SAT score).
11
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820.85 A student-athlete will not qualify with an SAT score lower
than 820 or a GPA lower than 2.0.86
In addition, Proposition 16 modified the classification of par-
tial qualifiers.8 7 A student-athlete who was not eligible under Pro-
position 16 could be classified as a partial qualifier by having a GPA
within the qualifier bracket, but an SAT or ACT score below the
minimum levels, or vice versa.8 8 For example, a person with a 2.75
GPA and an SAT score of 810 is considered a partial qualifier be-
cause the SAT score is too low to meet qualifier status.89 Partial
qualifiers cannot compete in athletic competition during their first
year, but they can practice with their teams and receive scholarship
assistance.1° Athletes with an SAT score of less than 720 are desig-
nated non-qualifiers by the NCAA and cannot participate in inter-
collegiate athletics or receive scholarships during freshman year.91
The NCAA failed to consider the negative impact the increased
academic requirements of Proposition 16 would have on minority
student-athletes. 92 Under Proposition 16, less than one-half of all
85. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 281. "For every 0.025 drop in GPA, the scale
requires an athlete to score ten points higher on the SAT or one point higher on
the ACT." Id.; see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 136-37 (using ex-
amples to show intricacies of sliding scale); see also Murray, supra note 57, at 104
(indicating interaction between SAT scores and CPA within context of sliding
scale).
86. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 281 (setting forth minimum score allowed on
SAT and minimum GPA, both of which must be offset by higher CPA or SAT score
respectively); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 136 (elaborating on
minimum SAT and ACT score requirements as well as minimum GPA needed to
achieve full qualification).
87. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 282 (defining new qualifications for achieving
partial qualifier status); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 136 (ex-
plaining students not achieving full qualifying status still have opportunity to
achieve partial qualifier status).
88. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 282 (illustrating that at least one requirement
for eligibility had to be within qualifying range in order for student-athlete to
achieve partial qualifier status); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at
136 (indicating procedure for achieving partial qualifier status).
89. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 282 (exemplifying how student-athletes can
become partial qualifiers while failing to achieve full qualifying status under Pro-
position 16); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 136 (noting scores
needed to achieve partial qualifier status).
90. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 282 (defining confines of partial qualifier sta-
tus); see also Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 136 (pointing out that while
partial qualifiers could not compete in intercollegiate athletics, they could still re-
ceive scholarship aid).
91. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 282 (explaining that failure to achieve either
minimum SAT score or minimum CPA renders student-athlete ineligible to re-
ceive athletic scholarship money and to compete in intercollegiate athletics).
92. See id. (discussing criticisms of Proposition 16); see also Mondello & Aber-
nathy, supra note 58, at 137-38 (citing statistics of how Proposition 16 impacted
high school seniors).
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African-American college-bound high school seniors met the new
eligibility requirements, compared with two-thirds of Caucasian and
Asian college-bound seniors.93 This adverse and uneven effect led
to much controversy, turmoil, and, eventually, litigation.94
C. Purposeful Discrimination, Title VI, and § 1981
To recover under Title VI or § 1981, a plaintiff cannot merely
assert Proposition 16 has a disproportionate effect on certain mi-
norities.95 There is no private cause of action for disparate impact
93. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 282 (pointing out percentage of African-Ameri-
can student-athletes qualifying under new requirements); see also Mondello & Ab-
ernathy, supra note 58, at 137-38 (elaborating impact that increased standards have
had on minority student-athletes' ability to qualify for eligibility).
94. See Hunt, supra note 10, at 282-83 (explaining how every eligibility rule has
been challenged and how Proposition 16 is no different); see also Mondello & Aber-
nathy, supra note 58, at 139 (holding that controversial issues of Proposition 16 are
not new and have existed since inception of "1.6 Rule").
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (ensuring equal rights under law). Section
1981 provides:
(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
sons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and no other.
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" in-
cludes the making, performance, modification, and termination of con-
tracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions
of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State
law.
Id.; see also Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). Title VI
provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance. For the purposes of this subchapter, the
term "program or activity" and the term "program" mean all of the opera-
tions of ... (2) (A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institu-
tion, or a public system of higher education; or (3) (A) an entire
corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole
proprietorship-(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partner-
ship, private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or (ii) which
is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care,
housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or (4) any other entity
which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph
(1), (2), or (3).
Id.; see Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 937 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding facially neutral
exemption not adopted with intent to discriminate against women). In Stehney, the
13
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of statutory law on minorities.96 The Supreme Court ruled that Ti-
de VI and § 1981 provide a private cause of action for intentional
discrimination only.97 Therefore, plaintiffs have to show that the
discrimination was intended, and not a mere by-product of the pol-
icy to sustain a claim under § 1981 or Title V!. 98
To prove intentional discrimination by "a facially neutral pol-
icy, a plaintiff must show that the relevant decisionmaker adopted
the policy at issue 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group."99 The mere awareness of the
consequences of an otherwise neutral policy will not be sufficient to
provide the basis for a Tide VI and § 1981 suit.'()(
Once purposeful discrimination is established, the policy-
maker must show that the policy can survive a test of strict scru-
tiny. 101 That is, the proponent of the policy must show that there
was a compelling interest in using a race-based classification and
plaintiff, a mathematician, was fired from the National Security Agency for refus-
ing to take a polygraph test. See id. at 928. She contended that the exemption
from the polygraph requirement for "world class mathematicians," and not her,
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 937.
The court, however, held that there was a rational basis for exempting the mathe-
maticians and dismissed the plaintiff's claim. See id.
96. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). "Title VI itself di-
rectly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination." Id. at 281.
97. See id. at 279-80. The plaintiff in Alexander brought suit to enjoin the Ala-
bama Department of Public Safety from using English as the only language on the
state's driver license exams. See id. at 279. He argued that the English-only policy
discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin. See id. The question
presented was whether private citizens can sue under Title VI for disparate impact.
See id. at 278. The Court held that there was only a private right to sue for inten-
tional discrimination under Title VI and not for disparate impact. See id. at 293.
98. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 390 (1982)
(holding that § 1981 could only be violated by purposeful discrimination). "The
complaint sought to redress racial discrimination in the operation of an exclusive
hiring hall established in contracts between Local 542 of the International Union
of Operating Engineers and construction industry employers doing business
within the Union's jurisdiction." Id. at 378. The issue in this case was whether
proof of discriminatory intent is necessary under § 1981. See id.
99. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). In this case, the appellee
had been passed over for better jobs despite high test scores due to Massachusetts's
veterans preference laws. See id. at 264-65. She brought suit for gender discrimina-
tion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 259. The Court held that the veterans preference did not purposely dis-
criminate against women because women could be veterans. See id. at 279. Fur-
thermore, the Court identified a test for purposeful discrimination. See id.
100. See id. (identifying test used to decide whether a policy is discriminatory).
101. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993). Appellants brought suit for
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering in the creation of a majority African-Amer-
ican district. See id. at 633-34. The Supreme Court held that the appellants had
stated a cause of action, but did not rule on its constitutionality because the proper
jurisdiction belonged to the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. See id. at 657-58.
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol10/iss2/6
2003] DISCRIMINATION IN NCAA ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 403
that the classification is narrowly tailored to achieve that compel-
ling interest.10 2
Before strict scrutiny is applied, however, a plaintiff must show
that he or she is entitled to relief under § 1981.103 A plaintiff must
show: (1) that he or she belongs to a racial minority; (2) an intent
to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) dis-
crimination concerning one or more of the activities enumerated
in § 1981, including the right to make and enforce contracts. 10 4
D. Past Cases: Cureton I and Cureton II
At the time of their decisions, the cases known as Cureton Po15
and Cureton 11106 were heralded as the most significant cases regard-
ing discrimination by the NCAA.107 Both were tried before the
Third Circuit and originate from the same lawsuit, Cureton v.
NCAA. 108 The plaintiffs were African-American student-athletes
who easily exceeded the NCAA GPA requirement, but failed to
achieve the necessary SAT score as required by Proposition 16.109
As a result, the NCAA denied both individuals eligibility to compete
in intercollegiate athletics during their freshman years." 1°
Relying on Title VI, plaintiffs alleged the NCAA's initial eligi-
bility requirements had a disparate adverse impact on African-
102. See id. at 658.
103. See Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 794 (3d Cir. 2001). The
plaintiffs, African-American smokers, brought a civil rights suit under § 1981 on
behalf of all living African-American smokers who had purchased tobacco prod-
ucts from the defendants. See id. The court of appeals upheld the district court's
dismissal of the case because there was no showing of disparity between the to-
bacco products sold to the African-American smokers and those sold to others. See
id. at 797. The court developed a test to establish a right to relief under § 1981.
See id.
104. See id. (providing elements necessary to establish right to relief under
§ 1981).
105. 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999).
106. 252 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001).
107. See Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58, at 148-49 (stating future impli-
cations of both Cureton decisions).
108. See Cureton II, 252 F.3d at 267; Cureton I, 198 F.3d at 107.
109. See Cureton 1, 198 F.3d at 109-10. Cureton ranked twenty-seventh in his
class and earned many academic honors. See id. at 109. Shaw was ranked fifth in
her class and was a member of the National Honor Society. See id. at 109-10. Gard-
ner and Wesby also exceeded the minimum GPA requirement enacted by the
NCAA. See id. at 110.
110. See id. (indicating that loss of eligibility was only one consequence of
failure to achieve minimum SAT score). Cureton alleged that he was dropped as a
recruit from many Division I schools after his failure to meet the SAT requirement.
See id. at 109. Shaw was given financial aid by her university, but was unable to
compete on the track team. See id.
15
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American students."'I The district court held that Proposition 16's
disparate impact on African-American athletes violated Title VI and
permanently enjoined the continued enforcement of Proposition
16.112
The Third Circuit in Cureton I reversed and remanded with in-
structions for the entry ofjudgment in favor of the NCAA, deciding
that the regulations applied only to the specific programs or activi-
ties for which an entity uses federal funds, and not to the entity at
large. I I" Therefore, Title VI did not apply to the NCAA because it
did not exercise controlling authority over its member institutions'
ultimate decision about a student athlete's eligibility to participate
in college athletics.' 14 Contrary to the theory alleged by the plain-
tiffs in Cureton I, the Supreme Court thereafter held that Title VI
did not create a claim for disparate impact in Alexander v. Sando-
val." 5 Title VI only reached instances of intentional discrimination
by a covered entity.' '6
On remand to the district court, the Cureton I plaintiffs moved
to either amend their complaint or to have the judgment altered so
as to add a claim of intentional discrimination based on the
NCAA's adoption or enforcement of Proposition 16.'17 The district
court denied the motion on grounds of prejudice, delay, and futil-
ity." 8 Again before the Third Circuit, in Cureton II, the court af-
111. See id. at 111 (explaining Title VI prohibits exclusion or discrimination
based on race, color, or national origin by any program receiving federal assis-
tance). The NCAA moved to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for sum-
mary judgment stating that there was no private right of action for unintentional
discrimination tinder Title VI and that the NCAA was not subject to Title VI be-
cause it did not receive federal funds. See id. The plaintiffs, in turn, moved for
partial summary judgment. See id.
112. See id. at 111-12. The district court cited two theories in support of its
conclusion that the NCAA was subject to the prohibitions of Title VI. See id. First,
the court found that the NCAA was an "indirect recipient of federal financial assis-
tance." See id. at 111. Second, the court held that Title VI covered the NCAA
because it has controlling authority over its member institutions that receive fed-
eral funds. See id. at 112.
113. See id. at 115 (expanding on court's reasoning regarding Title VI
coverage).
114. See Cureton 1, 198 F.3d at 116-17. The dues paid to the NCAA by its mem-
bers were not paid by federal funds. See id. at 116. The ultimate decision to either
accept or reject a student rested with the educational institution. See id. at 117.
115. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). For further a discussion of the Supreme Court's
decision in Alexander, see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
116. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 281 (analyzing precedent in holding that Title
VI only reaches intentional discrimination).
117. See Cureton II, 252 F.3d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing district court's
decision to deny plaintiffs' motion to amend).
118. See id. at 273-74. The district court gave four reasons for the denial of
plaintiff's motion: the three-year wait between filing of complaint and the motion;
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firmed dismissal on grounds of prejudice and delay only,
concluding that allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint
would require the NCAA to relitigate the entire case.'" 9 The plain-
tiffs, in turn, admitted that they could have filed an intentional dis-
crimination claim in the beginning, but had chosen not to do so.1
20
IV. ANALVySiS
The plaintiffs in Pryor made several claims against the NCAA
under Title VI, § 1981, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act.' 21
The court addressed each claim, deciding whether the plaintiffs
had established a claim for relief based on the pleadings.' 22 The
court emphasized that because its review was at the pleading stage,
it could not render findings of fact in this case.' 2 3 Initially, the
court reviewed Pryor's claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act. 124 It subsequently addressed the allegations of purposeful dis-
crimination and deliberate indifference made under Title VI and§ 1981.125
A. ADA and Rehabilitation Act
1. The District and Appellate Courts "Block" the Claims
The district court found Pryor's claim under the ADA and Re-
habilitation Act inappropriate at the time due to a "lack of redress
and lack of ripeness."' 26 The district court reasoned that because
the two-and-a-half-year knowledge of the information necessary to file the motion;
the effect on judicial efficiency; and the interest of finality. See id.
119. See id. at 273-74, 276. The length of time between the complaint and
motion alone does not require a denial on the grounds of delay. See id. at 273. At
some point, delay becomes "undue." See id. The undue delay will become either a
burden on the court or prejudicial to the opposing party. See id.
120. See id. at 271 ("Plaintiffs acknowledge that they considered moving to
amend their complaint to allege intentional discrimination . [but] plaintiffs
made a tactical decision not to .... ).
121. See Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 552 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting various
claims of racial discrimination by plaintiffs).
122. See id. at 552-53 ("In this close and complex appeal, we must decide
whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim for purposeful, racial discrimination ... by
alleging that the [NCAA] adopted certain educational standards because of their
adverse impact on black student athletes seeking college scholarships[, and w]e
hold that they have ....").
123. See id. at 566 (explaining no discovery had been conducted at time of
appeal).
124. See id. at 560-62 (laying out appellate court's reasoning for rejection of
ADA and Rehabilitation claims).
125. See id. at 562-70 ("We address [purposeful discrimination] first and Plain-
tiffs' 'deliberate indifference' theory thereafter.").
126. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 557. Because Pryor could recover her fourth year of
eligibility, there were no legal or equitable forms of relief available to her. See id.
17
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Pryor could still gain relief from the NCAA under its bylaws, bring-
ing the action prior to the exhaustion of such relief was improper
and failed for lack of ripeness. 127 The court explained that Pryor
could still "earn back" her lost year of eligibility in 2003, and thus
the action would not be viable until after that time.128
The appellate court upheld both the reasoning and holding of
the district court.129 It further highlighted that Pryor had no claim
for damages under the ADA because her partial qualifier status al-
lowed her to receive an athletic scholarship. 131 Moreover, Pryor
had not yet lost her fourth year of eligibility. 31 The NCAA provides
in its bylaws that learning-disabled athletes can "earn back" a fourth
year of eligibility by completing seventy-five percent of their degree
requirements by the end of their fourth year.' 32 Pryor will not
enter her fourth year of potential eligibility until 2003. 3 Provided
she meets the eligibility requirements at that time, she will receive
her lost year of eligibility as well as the relief she sought in this case
under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 134 According to
the court, because Pryor did not have constitutional standing for
these claims, it did not need to address them. 13 5
127. See id. (outlining district court's decision regarding Pryor's ADA and Re-
habilitation Act claims).
128. See id. ("[W]hile Pryor's complaint satisfied the constitutional standing
requirements of injury and causation, it did not meet the third prong concerning
legal and equitable redress.").
129. See id. at 561-62 (upholding dismissal of Pryor's ADA and Rehabilitation
Act claims). The court found that it could not yet determine if Pryor would re-
ceive her fourth year of eligibility. See id. at 561.
130. See id. ("[B] ecause we can only speculate that Pryor may someday lose a
fourth year of eligibility based on some future event, i.e., the failure to meet 75%
of her degree requirements by the end of her fourth year . no constitutional
standing lies over Pryor's ... claims.").
131. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 561 (explaining NCAA bylaws allow learning-dis-
abled athletes ability to regain lost fourth year of eligibility by fulfilling certain
requirements by fourth year).
132. See id. (outlining requirements necessary for learning-disabled athletes to
regain lost year of eligibility); see also Disability Services Certification and Waiver Process,
at http://www.ncaa.org/databases/regional-seminars/guide_rules-compliance/
eligibility/elig_03.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (explaining NCAA Division I
Bylaw 14.3.3.2 and how learning-disabled students can earn back fourth season of
eligibility).
133. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 561 (stating Pryor's ability to earn back her fourth
year of athletic eligibility will not be determined until 2003).
134. See id. at 561-62 (explaining Pryor is doing well academically and is pro-
jected to fulfill necessary requirements).
135. See id. at 562 (reasoning because Pryor's future eligibility was based
purely on speculation, appellate court went no further in determination of ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims).
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2. No Pass Interference Declared by the Referee or the Critics
Both the district and appellate courts' rulings on Pryor's ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims were consistent with each other and
with past precedent. 136 Pryor had not exhausted her options for
relief-she still could receive relief from the NCAA itself.13 7 There-
fore, her claim had not ripened to the point that a court would be
justified in granting her relief. 13 8
B. Purposeful Discrimination
1. District Court Fumbles, "Ball" Picked Up by Appellate Court
The main focus of the appellate court's opinion concerned
both the Title VI and § 1981 claims.1 39 The Third Circuit found
that the allegations set forth in the plaintiffs' complaint were suffi-
cient to withstand a motion to dismiss."4" The court remanded
these claims for further proceedings.' 4'
Under the Title VI and § 1981 claims, the plaintiffs asserted
two theories of relief.142 The first theory was purposeful discrimina-
tion; the second was deliberate indifference. 143 In reaching its deci-
136. See id. at 557, 562 (showing consistencies of district court and appellate
court rulings concerning eligibility requirements).
137. See id. at 552. Pryor irrevocably lost her freshmen year eligibility, but if
she maintains her academics, the NCAA can award her that lost year after her
fourth year at college. See id. This is contingent upon her completion of seventy-
five percent of her degree requirements by that time. See id.
138. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 552. Because Pryor had not exhausted her options
for relief, she failed the Constitution's "case or controversy" requirement for ripe-
ness. See id.
139. See id. at 560-70 (detailing court's ruling on Title VI and § 1981 claims).
140. See id. at 564 (deciding plaintiffs sufficiently stated claim for purposeful
discrimination afterjudging pleadings on their face). According to Rule 12(b) (6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may affirm the judgment only if
it appears beyond any doubt that no set of facts would entitle the plaintiffs to
relief. See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). In judging a motion to dismiss, the
court must refer to the pleadings in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See
Pyor, 288 F.3d at 559.
141. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 570. The appellate court remanded the Title VI
and § 1981 claims back to the district court for a trial on the merits. See id.
142. See id. at 560 (allowing arguments on "deliberate indifference" and "pur-
poseful discrimination" theories).
143. See id. (maintaining purposeful discrimination is key element of Title VI
and § 1981 claims and rejecting disparate impact theory in favor of purposeful
discrimination). There is only a private right of action allowed under purposeful
discrimination. See id. Title VI and § 1981 do not allow a private right of action for
disparate impact. See id.
19
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sion, the court rejected the theory of deliberate indifference, while
upholding the claim of purposeful discrimination. 144
The court first addressed the plaintiff's claim of purposeful dis-
crimination.1 45 To reach its decision, the court employed judicial
guidelines to confirm if indeed intentional discrimination by a
facially neutral policy was established sufficiently, enabling the
claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 146
To recover under the theory of intentional discrimination, the
plaintiffs could not simply allege that Proposition 16 had a dispro-
portionate effect on minorities. 147 Pryor and Spivey had to prove
that the NCAA adopted Proposition 16 intentionally to impose ad-
verse effects upon African-American student-athletes. 148 According
to the appellate court, the complaint and accompanying exhibits
sufficiently showed that the NCAA expressly considered race when
it adopted Proposition 16.149 The NCAA explicitly stated that one
of the major goals of Proposition 16 was to increase the graduation
rates of African-American athletes relative to white athletes.15 0 The
complaint also alleged the NCAA instituted Proposition 16 by rely-
ing on studies and reports that showed that the increased academic
requirements would "screen out" the number of African-American
athletes who would meet the standards. 151
144. See id. (explaining why court reasoned "purposeful discrimination" is
proper theory in case as opposed to "disparate impact").
145. See id. at 564 (explaining review of "purposeful discrimination" under
Rule 12(b) (6) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure standard).
146. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 564-65. At this point, the court only had the plead-
ings and the attached exhibits from which to base its decision. See id. As with any
motion to dismiss, the pleadings had to be judged in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs. See id.
147. See Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 937 (3d Cir. 1996). For a further
discussion of Stehney, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
148. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 562 (explaining for intentional discrimination,
plaintiffs must prove NCAA enacted Proposition 16 with purpose of harming Afri-
can-Americans).
149. See id. at 564 (citing allegations made in complaint). The plaintiffs' com-
plaint cited NCAA memoranda and other evidence presented in the Cureton trial.
See id. at 555. It also mentioned an interrogatory answered by the NCAA identify-
ing a goal that Proposition 16 would narrow the "Black/White Gap" between Afri-
can-American graduation rates and white graduation rates. See id.
150. See id. at 564 (citing increased graduation rates of African-American stu-
dents as one of NCAA's primary goals in adopting Proposition 16). The effect of
Proposition 16 has been to decrease the number of eligible African-American stu-
dent-athletes, while maintaining the number of eligible white student-athletes. See
Mondello & Abernathy, supra note 58 at 137-38.
151. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 564 (stating NCAA enacted Proposition 16 because
it at least partially intended to prevent more African-American student-athletes
from becoming eligible).
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The appellate court rejected the ruling of the district court,
stating "the NCAA adopted Proposition 16 'in spite of' its impact on
black athletes, not 'because of' that impact."' 52 By relying on the
face of the complaint and "all reasonable inferences thereto," the
appellate court found that the NCAA partly intended to reduce the
number of African-Americans eligible for athletic scholarships. 153
In its defense, the NCAA asserted that the complaint proved
only that the organization intended to help African-American ath-
letes, arguing based on precedent, which "absolve[s] deci-
sionmakers from purposeful-discrimination liability so long as their
intent was 'benign' or (in the words of Plaintiffs' counsel in Cure-
ton) 'laudable.' "54 The court rejected this argument, stating that
although it was difficult to imagine that the NCAA embraced sinis-
ter motives, a policy that purposefully discriminates on account of
race is presumed void unless it survives strict scrutiny. 155 The claim
of purposeful discrimination would remain intact until after a find-
ing of fact that the NCAA did not intend to discriminate on the
basis of race.1 56
2. Touchdown Declared by Referee and Critics
The Third Circuit correctly concluded that the plaintiffs' claim
of purposeful discrimination was valid and could withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss.' 57 First, the plaintiffs only had available to them a
152. Id.
153. See id. at 564 (describing complaints and impact of pre-Proposition 16
studies).
154. Id. at 565 (explaining two reasons why NCAA's argument was
unconvincing).
First, . . . the complaint adequately allege[d] that the NCAA sought to
achieve its stated goal of improving graduation rates by using a system
that would exclude more African-American freshmen who, in the past,
might have qualified for scholarships. Second, even assuming the
NCAA's assertion that it had only "laudable" goals in adopting Proposi-
tion 16 and that it actually wanted only to improve graduation rates
among black student athletes, the NCAA ... cited no authority holding
that a claim for purposeful discrimination may lie only if the accused
decisionmaker had "bad intentions" or "animus."
Id. at 565-66.
155. See id. at 566 ("[A]t first glance, some might well consider this theory far
fetched[, b]ut we are reviewing this case at the pleading stage, not the summary
judgment stage.").
156. See id. (explaining that after discovery period and trial, further facts may
prove plaintiffs' allegations false).
157. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (holding private
cause of action possible tinder purposeful discrimination); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 643 (1993) (explaining showing of purposeful discrimination needed to sur-
vive strict scrutiny to be validated); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania,
458 U.S. 375, 378 (1982) (ruling liability under § 1981 required showing of pur-
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claim of purposeful discrimination.158 A claim of disparate impact,
which the court validly dismissed, is not allowed by private individu-
als under Title VI.159 African-American student-athletes who had
been affected by the NCAA's academic requirements attempted to
persuade courts that the "SAT cut-off score ha[d] no demonstrable
relationship to a permissible goal under a disparate impact analy-
sis."16) The Supreme Court in Alexander, however, put an end to
disparate impact suits under Title VI. 1 6 I The Court held that Title
VI does not forbid unintentional discrimination like disparate im-
pact. 1 6 2 Only claims of intentional discrimination may be made
under Title VI.16 3
Upholding the § 1981 claim was valid because a showing of
purposeful discrimination is the only way to claim relief under
§ 1981.164 The plaintiffs could demonstrate that the NCAA knew
that Proposition 16 would have adverse effects; thus, the court cor-
rectly concluded that there was sufficient showing to illustrate that
the NCAA could have instituted Proposition 16 for that reason.165
The Third Circuit ruled that the complaint sufficiently set
forth a valid allegation of purposeful discrimination, thus address-
ing the alternative theory of deliberate indifference was unneces-
poseful discrimination); Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (empha-
sizing plaintiffs must show policy was instituted "because of," not "in spite of"
adverse effects on racial minority); Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 937 (3d Cir.
1996) (stating plaintiffs must do more than simply assert disparate impact). For a
further explanation, see supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
158. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 281 (showing claim of purposeful discrimina-
tion is only allowed in private cause of action).
159. See id. (concluding disparate impact claim was not allowed in private
cause of action under Title VI).
160. Lesley Chenoweth Estevao, Comment, Student-Athletes Must Find New Ways
to Pierce the NCAA's Legal Armor, 12 SETON HALL J. Spowrs L. 243, 244-45 (2002)
(explaining theories used prior to Supreme Court decision in Alexander).
161. See id. at 245 (providing no remedy for private plaintiffs against private
entities for violation of disparate impact regulations promulgated tinder Title VI
by federal agencies).
162. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 275; Estevao, supra note 160, at 245 (explaining
Congress does not provide right to enforce regulations going beyond proscriptions
of Title VI).
163. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 281 (holding Title VI claims can only be made
for intentional discrimination).
164. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 388-89
(1982) (holding § 1981 liability requires showing of purposeful discrimination).
165. See Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("'Discriminatory
purpose' ... implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.").
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sary. 166 Nonetheless, because the plaintiffs continued to pursue
deliberate indifference as an alternative theory, the court elected to
address it.167 The court rejected the theory as a reasonable basis for
relief by showing that Title VI "directly reache [d] only instances of
intentional discrimination."' 68 By claiming deliberate indifference,
the plaintiffs implicated extreme indifference by the NCAA regard-
ing the impact Proposition 16 had on African-American athletes. 169
According to the complaint, it did not matter whether the discrimi-
nation was intended. 70 The court found no significant distinction
between the deliberate indifference rule offered by the plaintiffs
and the established rule that a decisionmaker does not commit pur-
poseful discrimination if he or she adopts a facially neutral policy
"in spite of," not "because of," its impact. 171 The Third Circuit
ruled correctly that the plaintiffs' theory of disparate impact could
not stand because the Supreme Court ruled in Alexander that there
was no private right of action for disparate impact. 172
C. § 1981: Third Circuit Goes for a Two Point Conversion
By holding that the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged
purposeful discrimination, the court also determined that the
plaintiffs had fulfilled two of the three elements necessary in a
§ 1981 analysis.' 73 The first prong of a § 1981 analysis requires that
166. See Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 567 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that
because one cause of action can survive motion to dismiss, it does not matter if
other one can).
167. See id. (noting because plaintiffs continued to push theory, court had to
explain its reasoning for its rejection).
168. See id. (indicating difference between disparate impact and purposeful
discrimination, and that only purposeful discrimination can be claim for relief
under Title VI and § 1981).
169. See id. (describing how plaintiffs tried to evade court's ruling by claiming
higher degree of indifference).
170. See id. (explaining indifference was inconsequential and only purposeful
discrimination matters).
171. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 568 (noting no difference in standards and thus
because court already found that NCAA enacted Proposition 16 "because of" its
impact on African-American student-athletes, plaintiffs' disparate impact theory
was irrelevant); see also Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279-80 (1979) (finding
no discriminatory purpose because "the law remains what it purports to be: a pref-
erence for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, not for men over
women").
172. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282 (2001) (denying claim that
"[t]o reject a private cause of action to enforce the disparate-impact regulations
... [the court] would [have] to ignore the actual language of [precedent]").
173. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 569 (elaborating on three prongs of § 1981
analysis).
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a plaintiff show that he or she is a member of a racial minority. 174
In this case, both plaintiffs were African-Americans, a minority
ethnicity in the United States. 75 The second prong requires that
the plaintiffs show that the defendants intended to discriminate on
the basis of race. 176 Because the standard for establishing an intent
to discriminate is the same for Title VI and § 1981, the court's rul-
ing that the complaint was sufficient to uphold a claim for pur-
poseful discrimination fulfilled this prong.1 77 Finally, the plaintiffs
must show that the discrimination concerned one of the activities
covered by § 1981.17 In this case, the activity was the right to
contract. '
79
D. Pryor Wins, but Gives Up Some Points Along the Way
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the district court of
Pryor's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.'8t 1 Yet, it reversed the
district court's dismissal of the Title VI and § 1981 claims, so long as
the claims rested on purposeful discrimination.181 As of the date of
this Note, these claims await decision by the district court.8 2
V. IMPACT
After the Third Circuit decisions in Cureton I and Cureton II,
which prohibited discrimination cases to be premised on the theory
of disparate impact, many feared there would be no avenue of re-
dress for plaintiffs who alleged harm from discriminatory policies of
the NCAA. 18 3 The Third Circuit, however, breathed life into dis-
174. See id. (explaining first prong of § 1981 analysis).
175. See id. at 554 (noting minority status of plaintiffs).
176. See id. at 569. A showing of purposeful discrimination on the face of the
pleadings fulfills this prong. See id.
177. See id. (citing prior reasoning that purposeful discrimination was suffi-
ciently alleged in plaintiffs' complaint).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) (explaining ability to enter into contracts is
one activity covered by § 1981).
179. See Piyor, 288 F.3d at 569. The NCAA could not avoid liability simply
because the conditions of the NLIs were not fulfilled. See id. Provided that the
plaintiffs can show that the NCAA enacted Proposition 16 (the condition that both
plaintiffs failed to meet) for the purpose of racial discrimination, the condition
will be void. See id.
180. See id. at 570 (discussing affirmation of district court's dismissal of ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims for lack of constitutional standing).
181. See id. (explaining reversal of dismissal of Title VI and § 1981 claims
under allegations of purposeful discrimination only, not deliberate indifference).
182. See id. (noting case was remanded for proceedings on Title VI and § 1981
claims).
183. See Estevao, supra note 160, at 278 (stating Proposition 16 cannot be at-
tacked in a private suit as unintentional racial discrimination).
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crimination claims by allowing purposeful discrimination claims in
Pryor.18 4 In effect, it simply was following the Supreme Court's
lead. 85 The Court had determined that unintentional discrimina-
tion, like disparate impact, could not be brought under Title VI,
but intentional discrimination, like purposeful discrimination,
could prevail. 186 The window of opportunity has been opened to
plaintiffs; it is now a waiting game to see if it will remain open. 187
The future of the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements is, at
present, still uncertain. Perhaps Pryor and other cases like it finally
have forced the NCAA to assess whether these eligibility require-
ments truly uphold the purposes for which they were enacted. Yet,
after decades of defending controversial initial eligibility require-
ments both inside and outside the courtroom, the NCAA is ex-
pected to institute new eligibility requirements. 88 The NCAA
Division I Board of Directors met in Indianapolis in August of 2002
to discuss a "large-scale, three-phase academic reform package."'1 89
The new requirements, if enacted, would take effect in the 2003 to
2004 academic year.' 90
One of the proposals being reviewed by the Division I Board of
Directors would increase the number of required high school core
courses from the present thirteen to fourteen.1 9' Eligibility would
still be decided on a sliding scale, weighing both GPA and standard-
ized test scores. 192 The proposal is favored by the NCAA president,
the Division I Board of Directors, and the six major Division I ath-
letic conferences, who claim that this proposal de-emphasizes the
standardized test scores. 193
184. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 560 (holding plaintiffs' allegations of purposeful
discrimination had merit and could be propounded).
185. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) ("Title VI itself di-
rectly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination.").
186. See id.
187. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 570 (stating Third Circuit remanded in part back to
district court for proceedings consistent with decision).
188. See Asher, supra note 1, at D1 (stating NCAA has been defending its use
of standardized test scores for twenty years and now appears to be discussing new
requirements).
189. See id. (reporting on meeting which occurred on August 8, 2002 to dis-
cuss proposed changes).
190. See id. (citing time constraints, special dates for voting, and institution of
new requirements if approved).
191. See id. (discussing proposed changes to Proposition 16's number of core
course requirements).
192. See id. The new proposal's sliding scale will allow a student with an 800
on the SAT to counter-balance with a 3.55 GPA. See id. This is unlike Proposition
16 where the sliding scale stops at a minimum SAT or minimum GPA. See id.
193. See Asher, supra note 1, at D1 (mentioning supporters of new proposal).
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Ideally, all parties affected will accept whatever new initial eligi-
bility standards the NCAA decides should replace Proposition 16.
If so, college bound athletes may not need to litigate eligibility in
order to get into the game.
Anneliese Munczinski
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